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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MICHAEL ROBERT DULIN, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vsf 
GERALD L. COOK, Warden, 
Utah State Prison, et al.# 
Defendant/Respondent. 
PLAINTIFFS REPLY BRIEF 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a dismissal of a petition for writ of 
habeas corpus by the plaintiff. This Court has jurisdiction to 
hear the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
78~2a~3(2)(j)(Supp.1989) as the Utah Supreme Court transferred 
this matter to this Court on May 5, 1989. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1* Whether the habeas Court erred in dismissing the 
petition* 
2. Whether the habeas Court was correct in deciding this 
petition on legal issues without holding an evidentiary hearing. 
3. Whether the evidence established by the Court below was 
sufficient to support plaintiff's convictions. 
4. Whether plaintiff's felony convictions were barred under 
the single criminal episode doctrine by his guilty plea to a 
lesser included offense. 
CASE NO. 890274-CA 
CATEGORY NO. 3 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff relies on his filed statement of the case as 
presented in his opening brief before this Court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The plaintiff relies on his filed statement of the facts 
that are on file with this Court in the plaintiff's opening brief. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
1. HABEAS RELIEF IS THE CORRECT AVENUE OF RELIEF 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF 
2. THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD HAVE HELD AN 
EVIDENTARY HEARING ON THE INEFFECTIVE CLAIM 
3. THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD HAVE RULED 
ON THE PLAINTIFF'S ANDERS ISSUE 
4. THE PLAINTIFF MAY RAISE THE INSUFFICIENCY ISSUE BEFORE 
THIS COURT IN THAT THE DISTRICT COURT 
RULED UPON THE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE 
5 THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN TRIED FOR BOTH 
POSSESSION CHARGES, IN THAT THIS VIOLATED 
UTAH CODE ANN. 76-1-402 and 76-1-403. 
ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. 
THE PLAINTIFF WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
IN THAT COUNSEL HAD ADVISED HIM NOT TO SEEK AN APPEAL 
The respondent states that there is no issues of facts in 
controversy in the case at bar. This is an incorrect statement. 
In the case of CHESS vs. SMITH, 617 P.2d 341 (1980), the Utah 
Supreme Court addressed this issue and stated as follows: 
"The alleged misstatement made to 
petitioner by his counsel with 
regard to the consequences of 
taking an appeal, when coupled with 
an alleged violation of a 
fundamental right during the trial 
proceedings, leads to the 
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conclusion that it would be 
unconscionable not to determine the 
truth of the petitioner's 
allegations because, if true, they 
constitute reversible error." 
The alleged allegations of the plaintiff's should have been 
determined in the District Court, so that the record would 
reflect this, but the District Court denied the plaintiff's 
motion for an evidentary hearing on this issue. 
Moreover, in the case of BOGGESS vs. MORRIS, 635 P. 2d 39 at 
42 (Utah 1981) states: 
"In STATE V. JOHNSON, Utah, 635 
P.2d 36, a companion case, we have 
held that a claim that a convicted 
defendant has been denied his 
constitutional right to an appeal 
should be presented to the 
sentencing court by a motion for 
postconviction relief under Rule 
65B(i), U.R.C.P. If the facts 
found by the district court is then 
empowered to resentence the 
defendant NUNC PRO TUNC upon the 
previous finding of guilt so as to 
afford him an opportunity to 
prosecute a timely appeal from his 
conviction." 
Thus, the district court should have either held a hearing 
or should have vacated the plaintiff's criminal conviction and 
resentenced him so that he could seek a direct appeal. 
The respondent claims that since the plaintiff knew of his 
right to an appeal but on the advise of counsel failed to seek a 
direct appeal he should now be barred from seeking habeas relief. 
This is incorrect due to the fact that he did not seek a direct 
appeal on the advise of his counsel. See, MURRY V. CARRIER, 106 
S.Ct. 2639, at 2650 (1986), wherein the Court stated: 
"That safeguard is the right to 
effective assistance of counsel, 
which, as this Court has indicated, 
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may in a particular case be 
violated by even an isolated error 
of counsel if that error is 
sufficiently egregious and 
prejudicial.M 
Also see ANDERS V. CALIFORNIA, 87 S.Ct. 1396. 
Wherefore, this plaintiff was denied his right to a direct 
appeal when his counsel of record advised him not to seek an 
appeal of his criminal convictions, even though she knew that the 
plaintiff had good appeal issues, but may not win. Thus, the 
plaintiff should be entitled to habeas relief. 
POINT II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD HAVE 
HELD AN EVIDENTARY HEARING TO DETERMINE THE FACTS 
The plaintiff was deprived of his right to a direct appeal 
by counsels advise and as such he was denied his right to 
effective assistance of counsel, see, SUMMER V. COOK, 759 P. 2d 
341 at 344 (Utah 1988); and CHESS V. SMITH, 617 P.2d 341 at 
343-44. 
Thus, the advise of counsel is good cause to bring this 
habeas relief. 
POINT III. 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT RULE ON 
THE PLAINTIFF'S ANDERS ISSUE 
The respondent have not addressed the plaintiffs third claim 
for relief from the District Courts order dismissing his habeas 
petition, thus the plaintiff would submit this issue on the 
points and authorities already on file with this Court in the 
plaintiff's opening brief. This Court should grant the plaintiff 
this claim since the respondents have not refuted this claim or 
presented any adverse arguments. 
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POINT IV. 
THE DISTRICT COURT OPENED THE DOOR FOR THE PLAINTIFF 
TO RAISE THE INSUFFICIENCY ISSUE IN ITS ORDER DISMISSING PETITION 
The District Court ruled that there was sufficient evidence 
presented to convict the defendant at his trial. Thus, the 
plaintiff can raise this issue on appeal from the District courts 
ruling dismissing his petition. 
There was no evidence presented at the plaintiff's trial 
that he had entered the Omega drive inn or that he took the gun 
that was stolen. The only evidence that was presented was the 
fact that the plaintiff had plead guilty to a possession of a 
firearm in another court. 
The evidence that was presented at the plaintiff's trial was 
that the plaintiff had plead guilty to a possession charge and 
this was used as prima facie evidence that the plaintiff did in 
fact commit the burglary and theft. This prima facie evidence 
and its use at a trial has been ruled by the Utah Supreme Court 
to be unconstitutional, following the rulings in, FRANCIS V. 
FRANKLIN, 105 S.Ct.1965 (1985); IN RE WINSHIP, 397 U.S. 358, 90 
S.Ct. 1068 (1970), and STATE V. WALTON, 646 P.2d 689 (Utah 1982), 
further see,STATE V. TURNER, 736 P.2d 1043 (Utah App. 1987). In 
the cases just cited by the plaintiff there was the same prima 
facie evidence used to convict these defendants and the Courts 
reversed them because the burden was shifted to the defendants in 
violation of the U.S. Constitution and the States Constitutions. 
Thus, there was not any reasonable evidence presented at the 
plaintiff's trial to sustain his convictions. 
Moreover, Utah Code Ann. 76-6-402(1) has been ruled to be 
unconstitutional in burglary and theft cases, see STATE V. 
TURNER, 736 P.2d 1043 (Utah App. 1987). 
POINT V. 
THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN TRIED 
FOR BOTH POSSESSION CHARGES, IN THAT THIS 
VIOLATED UTAH CODE ANN, 76-1-401, 76-1-402 and 76-1-403 
In the case at bar the Plaintiff was tried twice for the 
same information, in that the first information alleged that the 
Plaintiff had in his possession a firearm on May 22, 1984. Said 
firearm was the possession that the Plaintiff was charged with in 
case CRS-WV-1856F and in case CR84-877. 
Its still the Plaintiff's position that he was guilty of two 
offense instantaneous and not as the Respondent has alleged at 
different times. 
Utah Code Ann. 76-1-402 (2) states in part: 
"Whenever conduct may establish 
separate offenses under a single 
criminal episode, unless the court 
otherwise orders to promote 
justice, a defendant shall not be 
subjected to separate trials for 
multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the 
jurisdiction of a single court, and 
(b) The offenses are known to the 
prosecuting attorney at the time 
the defendant is arraigned on the 
first information or indictment. 
Its been clearly settled that the Plaintiff falls in all of the 
categories stated in U.C.A. 76-1-402 and as such the second 
prosecution should have been barred under Utah rules, statutes 
and criminal procedures. See, WAYNE V. RIANES, 690 F.2d 685 at 
687 (1982); also see, CARTER V. MCCARTHY, 806 F.2d 1373 at 1376 
(9th Cir. 1986). The CARTER court stated: 
"It is clear, therefore, that were 
we to rest our decision on the 
state rule violation, we would not 
avoid the constitutional question. 
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Accordingly, we see no reason to 
rely on that alternative ground." 
Id. at 1376 n. 2 
Thus, in fact a violation of a state rule of criminal 
procedure can violate the Plaintiff's right and create a 
constitutional violation, as is the case at bar. 
The Respondent has argued that the Plaintiff could be found 
guilty of U.C.A. 76-10-503, but in fact this is incorrect because 
the Respondent relies on the new statute and cites the new 
statute to this Court in error. The statute in 1984 read as 
follows: 
"(b) Any person who violates this 
section is guilty of a class A 
misdemeanor, and if the dangerous 
weapon is a firearm or sawed-off 
shotgun, he is guilty of a third 
degree felony." 
Thus, it clear that the possession charge that the Plaintiff 
plead guilty to could not have been under U.C.A. 76-10-503. 
Furthermore, as is stated by the prosecutor at the Preliminary 
Hearing in the case at bar, the judgment is being amended to read 
correctly. Thus, the judgment of possession by a restricted 
person was amended to read possession, of what? Its clear to the 
Plaintiff that it had to be of a stolen firearm, because the 
court could not allow the Plaintiff to plead guilty to a felony 
and then sentence him to a class A misdemeanor. 
The Respondent cites this Court to the case of STATE V. 
SOSA, 598 P.2d 342 (Utah 1979), this case is clearly 
distinguishable from SOSA, in that he was charged with a Class B 
misdemeanor, whereas in the case at bar the Plaintiff was charged 
with a Class A misdemeanor. A class A misdemeanor is indictable 
and as such all offense could have and should have been tried in 
the same court. 
The Respondent would have this Court believe that the 
possession for theft count occurred before the possession that 
was charged as a Class A misdemeanor, this is clearly in error. 
The Plaintiff, if in fact he did commit the burglary had to 
become in possession for the theft count and the other possession 
at the very same instant and not at separate times. Thus, the 
case at bar is clearly distinguishable from the cases of STATE V. 
CORNISH, 571 P.2d 577 (Utah 1977); and STATE V. IRELAND, 570 P.2d 
1206 (Utah 1977), in that the offenses in those case were 
committed after the completion of the first offense and not at 
the same time or instants. 
Further, it should be noted by this Court that the 
Respondent fails to point out to this Court that the Plaintiff 
plead to a Class A misdemeanor which is indictable and triable in 
the District Court, moreover, must be tried in the District 
Court. 
The Plaintiff was found to be in possession of the gun at 
2:15 a.m. on May 22, 1989, at this time the Plaintiff was found 
to be in possession of a firearm and also in possession of stolen 
property (theft). As the case cited by the Plaintiff, STATE V. 
BAIR, 671 P.2d 203 (Utah 1983), it was when the possession was 
found, not at the time of the alleged theft. 
Thus, the Plaintiff contention that he could not be tried 
twice is founded and supported by the record and as such his 
convictions for burglary and theft and the habitual criminal 
should be vacated. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the herein cited cases and arguments presented to 
this Court by the Plaintiff this Court should find that the 
Plaintiff was denied effective assistance of counsel, that the 
Plaintiff's rights to due process of law were violated by 
counsels enaction • 
That the lower courts ruling dismissing the Plaintiff's 
petition should be vacated• 
Dated this 10 day of December, 1989. 
Respectfully submitted by, 
MICHAEL R. DULIN (EVANS) X 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 10th day of December, 1989, 
that I placed two copies of the foregoing in the United States 
Mail, PLAINTIFF'S REPLY BRIEF, addressed as follows: 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Attorneys for Respondents 
MICHAEL R. DULIN (EVANS) 
P.O. Box 1989 
Ely, Nevada 89301 
Plaintiff in pro se 
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